

# The Compatibility of Devine Foreknowledge and Predestination to Human Freedom in Medieval Philosophy

## Introduction

The problem of trying to reconcile the concept of an omniscient God and the concept of human freedom is truly one of the most genuinely interesting problems associated with the existence of God. The problem itself is Pauline in origin - dating from the Epistles according to St. Paul.<sup>1</sup> Before culminating in the seventeenth century German philosophy of Leibniz, the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and free will enjoyed approximately seventeen hundred years of philosophic and religious debate. This essay will focus on the contribution of Saint Augustine, Boethius, and John Duns Scotus to the problem of God's omniscience and free will. This essay, therefore, will only cover a brief period of the issue's history. The choice of these three philosophers is not arbitrary. The problem itself enters medieval philosophy through Augustine. Boethius does much to advance the topic and provides a solution that would influence both St. Aquinas and St. Anselm. Lastly, most subsequent work on God's foreknowledge and human freedom was informed by the once prominent thirteenth century philosopher John Duns Scotus. His treatment of the compatibility of God's foreknowledge and free will was to influence how the issue was dealt with by Molina, Luther, Calvin, Hobbes, and Leibniz. Augustine and Boethius both exhibit considerable skill and creativity to preserve human freedom in spite of an all knowing God. Scotus too demonstrates considerable ingenuity in maintaining a form of human freedom despite God's knowledge of all possible future events.

Do you believe that God possesses knowledge of all of your future actions? Do you believe that before you act God knows what you will do, what you will think, and how you will treat others? In the Judeo-Christian tradition the concept of God is such that He is an infinite being who possesses all positive qualities to their most eminent degree. Since God is characterized as omniscient, because He is all knowing, He necessarily possesses foreknowledge of all your future actions. If God's knowledge is never in error then how could you ever act contrary to his foreknowledge? Don't you also believe that you have free will, that the only thing determining your behaviour is the will itself? More than any other theologically orientated issue, foreknowledge and free will seriously challenges the very point of Christianity and salvation. Foreknowledge and free will, therefore, is

of special concern for the largely theologically orientated philosophy developed within the middle ages.

## Saint Augustine

But what exactly is the problem of foreknowledge and free will? The problem itself is fascinating with a history as long and important as any other major philosophical issue. How is God's foreknowledge of human behaviour compatible with the doctrine of free will? Precisely because of its long history there is a particular difficulty of formulating the problem in general terms. As it happens philosophers have simply tended to formulate the problem in different ways. There is no one "correct" formulation and attempting to synthesize its sometimes divergent representations proves arduous. Augustine of Hippo was one such philosopher, articulating the problem in such a way that would be modified by his successors. To be sure, the medieval world was first introduced to the ensuing problem through his writing alone.

Augustine's writing bears the stamp of the medieval technique of *disputation*, a common method of philosophical presentation during the middle ages and one still utilized today.<sup>2</sup> Disputation is the intellectual method of first presenting the strongest possible argument against the thesis you are trying to advance, refuting those arguments, and then presenting your own alternative. Through the method of disputation Augustine addressed God's omniscience and human freedom in terms of their inconsistency: If God possesses foreknowledge of all future events, and God's knowledge is never in error, then we do not commit sins voluntarily by our will, but by necessity in accordance with divine foreknowledge. Since we cannot act otherwise than is foreknown by God, His omniscience excludes the possibility of our actions being determined by free choice. In other words, God's knowledge of all future events is incompatible with human freedom. Moreover, God punishes us for sins committed by necessity even though we are not responsible for them. How, therefore, is the freedom of the will, a doctrine Augustine firmly believed in, compatible with God's "inevitable"

knowledge of the future? “We have knocked vigorously at the door of God,” Augustine says, no doubt dramatizing his response, “let it be open to those who knock.”<sup>3</sup>

There are two propositions Augustine thinks he needs to reconcile to in order to demonstrate a consistent relationship between God’s knowledge and the behaviour of man. 1) God possesses all knowledge of all future events. 2) We do not sin by necessity but by free will. By demonstrating that God’s omniscience is consistent with volition Augustine believed he could force responsibility for sinning on man’s will, taking away the opportunity of those who would sooner excuse their sins than take responsibility for them.

As regards the first proposition Augustine simply took God’s omniscience as an article of faith. To deny that events unfold otherwise than by His knowledge, Augustine thought, was blasphemous – even malicious.<sup>4</sup> To accept God’s omniscience is to accept His foreknowledge of our committing sins and hence the necessity of our sinning. Augustine thought the question of God’s foreknowledge torments many people because they do not ask it in the right way.<sup>5</sup> There are many who are too quick to excuse their sins by necessity instead of confessing and taking responsibility for them. Hence some deny the existence of God and blame chance or fortune in what Augustine called a “stupid and senseless error.”<sup>6</sup> Still others, while accepting divine providence, think He is less than perfect or powerful, even unjust, rather than piously confessing their sins. What, then, is Augustine’s method for harmonizing foreknowledge and free will?

The concept of *necessity* is central to Augustine’s solution to the problem constituted by divine foreknowledge. Augustine believed that necessity is given a greater role and influence in our behaviour than is warranted, referring incorrectly to a cause and effect relationship. Augustine thought that many people believed the assertion ‘God knows *X* will happen’ was synonymous with ‘God causes *X* to happen.’ In regards to the knowledge God possesses of future human behaviour,

Augustine thought the surreptitious inclusion of causation *from* God's knowledge to human behaviour is misleading. In fact, by *reductio* Augustine demonstrates that is absurd and therefore false.

First, grant that God's knowledge of events before they occur causes those events to occur. Presumably, if God possesses knowledge of all future events it follows that God not only knows what you and I will do in the future but God also knows what He will do in the future. If everything that is foreknown by God happens not by an act of the will but by necessity then God's actions too are determined not by an act of the will but by necessity.<sup>7</sup> Hence God does not possess free will but His actions, like ours, are determined by the causal necessity His prior knowledge imposes on the future. The idea that God is not in possession of free will, Augustine thinks, speaking with a theological authority unparalleled in the development of Christianity, is absurd. Second, we do not know, Augustine considers, whether a year from now we will be happy but surly God knows because He possesses full and complete knowledge of all our future actions. Since God knows we will be happy in a year's time, and His prior knowledge entails causation, it is not a result of our willing it that we are going to be happy a year from today, but a result of divine necessity. When we are happy a year from now our happiness is *not* the result of our free will, but a result of God's knowledge. In other words God knows what is going to be willed when nothing is going to be willed! "Strange foolishness" Augustine thinks.

After proving through the method of disputation that God's 'causal knowledge' leads to absurdity, after demonstrating that God's foreknowledge *must* be something other than causal, what does Augustine present as his own thesis? How does he show that God's foreknowledge is compatible with volition? He has already given you a clue. God's foreknowledge, Augustine thinks, God's necessary knowledge of our future behaviour does *not* entail causation. Put another way, necessity does not exclude the will. Assuming it does, Augustine has shown, leads to absurdity. "Though God foreknows what we shall do in the future," Augustine writes in his *On Free Choice of the Will*, "this does not prove that we do not will anything voluntarily."<sup>8</sup> If I am happy a year from now, I am

happy as a result of my choosing it. God's foreknowledge does not *make* me happy; my happiness is a result of my free will – God just knows how I will use it. God knows whether a year from now I will choose optimism instead of pessimism when I wake up. He knows the result of my choice before I do because He possesses the knowledge of the outcome of my independent deliberation and action. This is Augustine's answer to the challenge of foreknowledge and free will. This is his answer to all those who do not take responsibility for their sins but resign themselves to fate or fortune. We can choose however we want; God just knows how we will choose. The sins we commit, therefore, are not committed out of causal necessity but are committed instead by a free act of our will. Since God's knowledge that we will sin is not the cause of sin, God's punishment for the sins we commit is just.<sup>9</sup>

If God knows what I will do with my freedom, if He indeed possesses complete knowledge of all my future actions as Augustine believes, then doesn't God also possess the knowledge of who will accept him and who will not? If he knows all of the trivial decisions I make throughout the day, won't He also possess knowledge about the decisions I make in regards to the most important questions; questions like whether I will accept Christ as my lord and Saviour? Augustine is conspicuously silent on this point. This is the greater question of determinism Augustine does not raise in his discussion of foreknowledge and free will, but a question that to some extent would occupy him later in life. Insofar as God knows how we will use our free will His knowledge is compatible with human freedom. It is precisely this compatibility, however, that forces Augustine into a position that would be popularized throughout all of Europe during the sixteenth century Reformation. Indeed, it is what the term "Calvinism" has come to mean: Predestination. Since God knows how I will use my free will, and His knowledge is never in error, He necessarily has foreknowledge of whether I will accept or reject Him as my Saviour. Before I was born, before my existence or the existence of my parents God knew what my decision would be. One can go so far as to speculate that *if* predestination is true, what was the point was of God sending Christ into the world? What was the point of creation? or why do human beings exist at all? On the one side there are those whom Augustine referred to as

the *elect* who are predestined to live in the kingdom of God. On the other side are the *retrobate*, the group whom Augustine thought were predestined to eternal condemnation.

Like any philosophical system, Augustine's did not develop in isolation but was influenced and directed by the chronological development of the philosophy that preceded it. Augustine's thoughts on foreknowledge and free will had been influenced by late ancient philosophy as presented to him through the writing of Cicero, the first and second century A.D., Roman statesman and orator. In the main, Cicero's writing was largely an articulation and exposition of the various philosophical systems throughout the Hellenistic period including epicureanism, stoicism, and skepticism. Augustine's treatment of foreknowledge and predestination was a philosophical inheritance from as early as the skepticism of the late Platonic academy.<sup>10</sup> Augustine had discovered through studying Cicero's *On Fate* and *On Divination* that the concept of God's foreknowledge was usually linked up with problems about divination.<sup>11</sup> What the late academic skeptics did, a move which Augustine could not, was to reject divination at the price of abandoning God's foreknowledge. Augustine could not take the same step even though the consequence of God's foreknowledge is predestination - the salvation of man beyond his control determined prior to his birth. Augustine's theological commitment to God's omniscience as an article of faith forced him to accept predestination as a consequence of the knowledge about God given by revelation. Augustine's objection to Cicero, and by extension his objection to the view of late academic skepticism that Cicero represented, is fundamentally the same position we have been dealing with all along. It does not follow from God's foreknowledge that nothing depends on our free choice.<sup>12</sup> While predestination is a consequence of God's foreknowledge, only in theologically innocuous sense may our actions be said to be 'fixed.'<sup>13</sup> In other words, responsibility for our salvation still rests squarely on our shoulders.

Later in life, however, Augustine defined predestination as God's "foreknowledge and preparation of those acts of kindness by which those who are saved are saved."<sup>14</sup> It is unclear, in the end, whether foreknowledge is distinct

from predestination after all. Most of his successors, and probably Augustine himself, eventually assumed that God's foreknowledge *just is* predestination.<sup>15</sup>

## Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius

Any discussion of the problem constituted by God's foreknowledge would be incomplete without studying the fifth and sixth century Roman statesman, theologian, and philosopher Boethius. Boethius' contribution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will does much to advance the treatment of it given by Augustine. His contribution to the controversy develops within the fifth book of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, a text he wrote in prison while awaiting execution for treason. After Boethius died the *Consolation* became a widely read and celebrated text throughout the middle ages prompting Gibbon once to describe it as "a golden volume not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or Tully."<sup>16</sup> In that text Boethius clearly recognized, as Augustine did not, that the issue of God's foreknowledge was *not* a matter of causation. The question was not whether God's prior knowledge causes future events - for Boethius it is all a question of the logical relationship between knowledge, time, and necessity.<sup>17</sup>

Any serious examination of Boethius' treatment of foreknowledge and free will must be clear about a pivotal distinction: The distinction between the necessity of a conditional - a *conditional necessity* - and what may be called a necessity under a condition or a *simple necessity*.<sup>18</sup> In English as in Latin the proposition 'if it is known that *p*, then necessarily *p*' is ambiguous.<sup>19</sup> It can mean 'if it is known that *p*, then *p*,' and since we cannot know a falsehood the proposition is true and in no way prevents *p* from being a free act of the will.<sup>20</sup> It can also be read in the stronger form of a conditional necessity. Hence, 'if it is known that *p*, then it is a necessary fact that *p*' which implies that it is not a contingent matter of the will that *p*.<sup>21</sup> Boethius thought that in general there was no reason to believe that the latter proposition was true.

For Boethius, although God knows all things that are knowable, there is a certain kind of knowledge He possesses about contingent matters of our will, and another different knowledge he possesses about everything else. To use Boethius' own example, it is a contingent matter of my will when I decide to walk down the street, but it is a conditional necessity that if I am a human being then I am mortal. "And so" Boethius writes, "those things which are present to God will without doubt happen: but some of them result from the necessity of things and some of them from the power of those who do them."<sup>22</sup> All things present to God will happen, some by conditional necessity and some from simple necessity. However, just as Augustine had to accept predestination as the consequence of God's foreknowledge regardless of free will, Boethius too encounters a similar difficulty.

Boethius thinks there is something odd about knowledge of the future. In fact, what Boethius discovers about knowledge of the future is equivalent to Augustine's position on predestination. When I think about the future I simply do not know whether a year from today I will need to buy groceries. But I do know, even now, that in a year's time *either* I will need to buy them *or* I will not. The former is a simple necessity, it is a contingent matter of my will that in a year I buy groceries, but the latter is a conditional necessity,<sup>23</sup> either I will buy them or I will not. More generally, it seems that what can be genuinely known about the future, and not just predicated with certainty, is confined to what is necessary.<sup>24</sup> Take  $p$  as a proposition about the future. It appears that not only do we have the innocuous necessity 'if it is known that  $p$ , then  $p$ ,' but also the stronger 'if it is known that  $p$ , then it is a necessary fact that  $p$ .'<sup>25</sup> Like Augustine facing the greater determinism of predestination, a meta-determinism if you like, so too Boethius faces the greater logical determinism of God's foreknowledge – which is incompatible with free will after all.<sup>26</sup>

But Boethius is not satisfied. He finds an ingenious way to both preserve divine providence and contingent acts of the will that avoids the problem of conditional necessities all together: Boethius places God outside of time. He was not the first to make this move, but in the Latin tradition he was the first to do so

in the context of this problem.<sup>27</sup> Here in lies the solution Boethius thought could maintain freedom of the will in spite of God's omniscience and predestination. Because God is outside of time, Boethius considers, He does not experience a succession of temporal events as we do. God's knowledge of time is the knowledge of what is eternally present before him; it is the knowledge of a 'never fading moment' – not foreknowledge of things to come.<sup>28</sup> For Boethius, God experiences all things simultaneously in a kind of 'eternal present.'

The cardinal mistake of those dealing with the problem before him, Boethius thought, was to assume that divine intelligence operates in a manner similar to the human mind.<sup>29</sup> While human beings do experience a past, a present, and a future, it is a mistake to think that God comprehends time in a similar way. Boethius thought that what was successive for man is simultaneous for God.<sup>30</sup> God does not experience a sequence of temporal events one after the other but experiences all things instantly and simultaneously as existing eternally present before Him. Just as human beings can have knowledge of present events without interfering in their necessity, so too God can possess full and complete knowledge of all events without interfering with them. In the exact way my present knowledge of seeing a man jump of a diving board into a pool in no way interferes with the necessity of him landing in the water, God possesses necessary 'foreknowledge' of our actions without interfering in our behaviour. Since God's knowledge is not conditioned to experience time in the same way we do, because He experiences all things in an 'ever present moment,' He can possess knowledge of our future actions without interfering with them. There is no predestination for Boethius because predestination assumes that God is a temporal being who experiences time in terms of linear succession.

The question remains to be answered: Why did Boethius think God existed outside of time? Boethius offers no argument for the existence of God, nor does he offer an argument for any of God's common attributes. In fact Boethius relies on a credibility only as strong as the consensus of rational creatures for "demonstrating" that God is an eternal being. "It is the common judgment...of all

creatures that live by reason that God is eternal. So let us consider the nature of eternity, for this will make it clear to us both the nature of God and His manner of knowing.”<sup>31</sup> In other words, grant that God is eternal and we will see what follows. Boethius goes on to define eternity as the “complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of everlasting life.”<sup>32</sup> Whatever is in time, Boethius thinks, is subject to a past, a present, and a future. Whatever “suffers” from existing temporally, he thinks, excludes anything eternal. By definition God cannot exist in time and creatures who experience temporal events cannot be eternal.

## John Duns Scotus

When one talks about God’s knowledge it is clear of course that one is not talking about human knowledge. For you or I to know something is to *know* that it is true. We cannot genuinely know something that is false; we can believe something – that it is false - but we cannot *know* it. To be sure, we believe rather than possess knowledge of a great many things. We do not know about the future as such, but we certainly believe many things about it. God’s knowledge, *just because it is God’s knowledge*, suggests a great deal more than mere belief about the future. In fact, it is likely that God doesn’t believe anything at all, since belief is something less than knowledge and God *knows* everything. For God to know about the future is to possess knowledge of necessary events which are yet to occur. Hence, Scotus’ question: Can God possess knowledge of something unnecessary? In other words, can the future be contingent or logically *unnecessary* and is God’s knowledge compatible with such contingency?<sup>33</sup> Scotus is certainly breaking with tradition, rejecting for example Aristotle’s view that true knowledge (‘scientia’) is *necessary* knowledge of *necessary* states of affairs.<sup>34</sup>

As we have seen Scotus formulates the problem of omniscience and free will different than either Augustine or Boethius. Augustine’s problem was to refute the “causal” necessity of God’s knowledge of our committing sins with our free will in sinning. Boethius’ problem was to preserve human freedom while maintaining God’s omniscience. Like Augustine and Boethius, Scotus thinks that

while we indeed possess free will, God knows our action before we perform them. Unlike Augustine, Scotus adopts the Boethian atemporal vision of God as represented by his theological and philosophical predecessor Thomas Aquinas. Like the Thomistic-Boethian solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will, Scotus thinks God exists outside of time. Unlike their solution, however, and closer to Augustine's, Scotus believes God still possesses knowledge of our future actions.

Recall that before Boethius moved God outside of time, he had distinguished two different kinds of knowledge possessed by God. God possesses knowledge of both simple necessitates and conditional necessities. Scotus too makes a theoretical partition when thinking about God but his is much more dramatic. Scotus makes the rather striking assumption that the will of God is separate from His knowledge. For Scotus not only is the nature of God constituted by the *Divine intellect*, which has prior knowledge of all future events, but the nature of God is also constituted by the *Divine will*, which creates or wills into existence a cause for every effect. The divine intellect, moreover, is a *not* a voluntary agent but is determined by the divine will. Notice the important difference at this point between Scotus and Augustine. For Augustine it was an absurdity to think God's actions were determined but for Scotus the determination of the divine intellect, by the divine will, is key for his idea of human freedom. Ultimately, it is the emphasis Scotus places on the will of God that goes along way to explain how, despite God's foreknowledge, the future may be contingent or logically unnecessary. There are two parts to Scotus' analysis of God's omniscience. First, Scotus explains why future events are not logically necessary. Second, he demonstrates how a contingent future is compatible with the necessary and certain foreknowledge of the divine intellect.

Scotus believes that there is an essential order of causes for every effect in the universe and every cause originates from, or is ordered by, God Himself.<sup>35</sup> For Scotus not only does God actively sustain all actual causal associations but all *possible* causal associations as well. Since Scotus equates "being contingent" with "having been caused contingently,"<sup>36</sup> it follows in his analysis that there can only

be contingent events if God causes contingently or causes outside of the strict necessity His knowledge entails. If there were a strict necessity on whatever God produced and foreknew, then the actual order of causes would be unavoidable and necessary in which case there would be no contingent events. Scotus, however, believes there are free acts of the will and since all causes originate in God it follows for Scotus that God causes contingently. There are contingencies for Scotus because there are some things God could have logically refrained from producing.<sup>37</sup>

Now all knowledge of necessary and contingent causes and effects are eternally present to the divine intellect. God comprehends all of the actual and possible combinations of every idea from his eternal viewpoint. For Scotus, however, the source of contingency is a part of God's will. There is contingency, Scotus thinks, because God *could* have willed into existence a different order of causes *other* than what He did. What exists, Scotus thinks, exists necessarily because it is known by the divine intellect, but God's divine will does not exclude the possibility of contingent events. According to Scotus the divine intellect presents the divine will with all possible states of affairs.<sup>38</sup> Of the choices present to the divine will, one is chosen and is willed into existence. Whatever the divine intellect chooses, Scotus thinks, is willed into actual existence. The divine intellect necessarily knows what actually exists because the divine will has created it. What presently exists, however, is itself contingent because the divine will could have willed into existence other than what it did. In this way, according to Scotus, God can have certain knowledge of future contingents or logically unnecessary acts.<sup>39</sup>

How does knowledge of unnecessary events relate to the individual, to the doctrine of free will? Since God is omniscient He knows what any possible human being would do if created. When God creates an individual He wills into existence an actual human being from all of the possible human beings he could have created. From our temporal perspective this human being has a complete life history<sup>40</sup> who, if created, would perform certain actions. In effect, when God wills an individual into existence He wills into existence a complete life history known to the divine intellect.<sup>41</sup> The life history of an individual is known

instantaneously to the divine intellect when the divine will creates it. Of course the existence of individual *X* is necessary and consistent to the extent that *X*'s existence is known to the divine intellect, but contingent to the extent that the divine will could have refrained from *X*'s creation. After all, the divine will could have willed into actual existence a different but nonetheless consistent individual and life history.

Scotus does have a view of human freedom, however, similar in fact to Augustine's. Human beings can deliberate between actions, but the choice we will make is already known to the divine intellect because the divine intellect knows what the divine will has created. It is possible that we could act otherwise than in accordance with the divine intellect only to the extent that the divine will could have willed into existence a different life history. My behaviour is contingent insofar as God could have refrained from willing into actual existence my present life, but necessary to the extent that the divine intellect would still possess complete knowledge of whatever individual the divine will decided to create.

## Conclusion

What can we conclude from this brief study of the medieval treatment of the problem created by God's omniscience? One conclusion that follows is that the traditional and *unmodified* conception of God entails predestination. The difficulty for Augustine was precisely trying to reconcile an unmodified conception of God not only with the sins committed by free will, but ultimately man's salvation. For Augustine God is conceived in the same way He is traditionally composed. He is perfect, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, entirely benevolent, and of course omniscient. Without alerting this image of God, specifically without altering the concept of omniscience, predestination follows as an immediate consequence.

A modification of the concept of God leads to mixed results for human freedom in Boethius and Scotus. Famously, Boethius locates God outside of time, believing that God *as a non-temporal being* necessarily knows all future events without interfering with them. For Boethius, human freedom is maintained by revising *how* God exists. Scotus, however, modifies the concept of God but still ends up with a view of human “freedom” bound by the knowledge of the divine intellect.

There is a particular difficulty in attempting to justify any modification of the concept of God for philosophic or religious ends. Granting that God exists, do Boethius and Scotus both think the nature of God is so malleable as to be tailored to their fancy, however extravagant or controversial? Apparently they both feel they are entitled to as much liberty as they want to *form* the concept of God to suit their ends. And what would happen if two philosophers held contradictory images of God both modified for the idiosyncratic detail of their philosophy? Who would have the “correct” depiction of God? Without appealing to Scripture, that is without committing the fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam*, there would be no standard to judge their competing worth.

Aside from any difficulties developing from the justification of the alteration of the concept of God, the problem created by God’s omniscience is unequivocally the most serious difficulty associated with the existence of God. It is very much a serious threat to Christian doctrine. *If* predestination is true, then the notion of God’s grace has nothing to do with salvation. Salvation through Christ is inapplicable: Those who are saved are saved, those who are not are not. The ten commandments as a prescription for moral behaviour serve no ultimate purpose. Neither our action nor our faith have anything to do with eternal life. Neither for that matter does the incarnation nor Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection. There is, to be sure, no *rational inconsistency* between God’s omniscience, predestination, and the collapse of Christian tenets.

As far as I can see, the philosopher theologian best suited to deal with these problems and to save Christianity *from itself* is Boethius. His solution rather easily

accommodates the independence of human freedom with a concept of God that is not as radical as Scotus'. Ironic then that while in prison, while awaiting torture and excision, Boethius chose lady philosophy to comfort and console him rather than Scripture; requesting paper and a quill rather than the Bible.

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## Notes

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- <sup>3</sup> Augustine. *On Free Choice of the Will*. Trans. Anna S. Benjamin & L.H. Hackstaff. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. 1964. p.89
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., 90
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., 89
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 89
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., 91
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 92
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., 94
- <sup>10</sup> Rist M. John. *Augustine, Ancient Thought Baptized*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994 p.268
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., 268
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 268
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., 268
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., 269
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., 269
- <sup>16</sup> Hyman, Arthur & James J. Walsh. *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1974 p.75
- <sup>17</sup> Spade, Paul Vincent. "Medieval Philosophy." *The Oxford History of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2000 p.75
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 75
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., 75
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 75
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 75
- <sup>22</sup> Boethius. *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Trans. Victor Watts. London: Penguin Books. 1999 p.138
- <sup>23</sup> Spade, 76
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., 76
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 76
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 76
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 76
- <sup>28</sup> Copleston, S. J. Fredrick. *A History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy*. Vol. II. New York: Doubleday. 1950. p.103
- <sup>29</sup> Barnett M. Helen. *Boethius: Some Aspects of His Times and Work*. New York: Russell & Russell. 1965. p.100
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 100
- <sup>31</sup> Boethius, 132
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., 132
- <sup>33</sup> Scotus, John Duns. *Contingency and Freedom*. Trans. A. Vos Jaczn, H. Veldhuis. A. H. Looman-Graaskamp. E. Dekker and N. W. den Bok. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994 p.19
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 18
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., 15
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 15
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., 15
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 16
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 16
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., 23
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 23