Opportunities Lost: Military Blunders of the Seven Days Campaign

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When the summer of 1862 began, hopes for the Confederacy were bleak. Many people on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line thought that the South's resistance was ready to buckle. While at least three western Confederate states sat comfortably in Union hands, the Atlantic states were fighting to stem amphibious offensives. By early June, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and 115,000 of the United States' best troops at that point in the war, the Army of the Potomac, were perched six miles from the Southern capital at Richmond. Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederate army worked urgently to construct earthworks around the city. The summer held the prospect for a decisive battle, but Federals and Confederates discovered that the impending clash would actually be a series of four major battles and four lesser engagements. Spanning one week, this collection of encounters became known as the Seven Days Battles. At this point in the Civil War, troops of both sides of the conflict were still untested. Generals, too, remained to be tried on the battlefield. The fighting at Richmond's gates showed commanders how detrimental the results of military mistakes could be. However, certain principles should have been understood at the beginning of the campaign. Through a week of vicious fighting, the casualties mounted as generals committed negligent errors. Neither the Army of Northern Virginia nor the Army of the Potomac had to suffer such heavy casualties to accomplish their goals, and the needless bloodshed could have been avoided had generals in both armies followed some of modern warfare's fundamental military conventions.[1]

When the Seven Days Battles opened on June 25, 1862, Robert E. Lee commanded 86,000 men that he could utilize in conducting the defense of Richmond. Not only was this the largest army ever fielded by the Confederacy during the war, but also it was the one with the most potential. Promising generals from all over the South sat proudly at the heads of brigades and divisions, ready to repel the Yankee invasion. Nevertheless, a large number of inept commanders held important positions in the army at this time, and even some of the men that would go on to greater things would prove that during this time in the war, they were not yet ready to fight in the modern form. Important commanders acted before thinking, others failed to act even when prodded to do so, and still others performed unsatisfactorily in battle. The Army of Northern Virginia's potential was put in check by these factors, and the Confederates would suffer heavy tactical defeats during the campaign, due much to their own generals' actions.[2]

The Army of the Potomac, while numerically superior, did not go into the campaign with any distinct qualitative advantage. Its command structure was equally

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immature, filled with bungling general officers and undeveloped civilian-generals. Much like the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia, McClellan's men would learn that offensive maneuvers in 1862 could not succeed without a viable command system, something the Army of the Potomac lacked, mainly because its highest ranking general fit the role of a quartermaster or ordnance officer as opposed to an army commander. Timid generalship would doom the Union offensive against Richmond, reducing it to a bloody handful of hollow Union tactical victories with no strategic backing.[3]

Before the commencement of the Seven Days, the Army of the Potomac rested dangerously close to Richmond. Although its soldiers were ready to make a move on the city, its commander was not as eager to do so. George McClellan refused to follow up his near victory at Seven Pines on June 1 with a general movement against Richmond. During the period spanning June 2-24, every day presented an opportunity to capture the Confederate capital. Instead, the Federal commander spent three weeks building entrenchments, hauling siege artillery close to the suburbs, and calling for reinforcements from Fredericksburg that he did not need and would not receive. "Little Mac's" passive strategy was to push slowly forward until his heavy guns were within range of the capital, and then blast it into submission. But a more favorable and effective alternative was to order a general assault on the defenses in front of his main troop body at Seven Pines. McClellan shunned this course of action, because it would result in what he considered a high number of casualties, and inadvertently gave Lee the time he needed to build stronger defenses and bring up over 20,000 reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley and the Carolinas. In just twenty-two days, the Federal commander wasted away his advantage in numbers, disposition, and momentum and allowed Lee enough time to steal the initiative.[4]

As a complement to his incessant demands for reinforcements, McClellan had committed a grave tactical error in isolating Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps north of the Chickahominy River, while the rest of the army was on the south side. The reasoning behind Porter's position was that it would serve as a link between the main troop body and reinforcements from the north. Notwithstanding that Lincoln had recalled the expected support, Little Mac still dangerously overextended his flank and left it open for an attack.[5]

Following Brig. Gen. J. E .B. Stuart's reconnaissance of the Federal right, Lee held a conference of his chief division commanders to discuss a course of action. The isolation of Porter's corps north of Richmond presented an enticing opportunity. Not only was Porter's right flank exposed, but V Corps was not within range of immediate help should it be attacked. If this isolated body of troops fell back, McClellan's supply base at White House would become exposed, and Lee's troops would find themselves virtually in the rear of the main Federal body. In this instance, Little Mac would have to withdraw to an alternate base or face Lee on ground of the latter's choosing. In spite of D. H. Hill's suggestion that an attack north of the Chickahominy River would needlessly expose Richmond by leaving it almost devoid of defenders, and James Longstreet's conclusion that Porter's position would be hard to crack, the Confederate commander chose to make the assault. Time would be of the essence, for in the critical

period between the start of the attack and McClellan's withdrawal, only two divisions would hold the trenches east of the capital. June 26 was set as the date the attack would begin.[6]

A deserter from Stonewall Jackson's Army of the Valley entered the Union camp on June 24 and revealed the Confederate plans. Jackson's troops were to threaten Porter's rear and force him to peel back defenses immediately in front of the Chickahominy, and the rest of Lee's force was to take advantage of this by crossing the river. McClellan now knew the enemy's strategy. Nevertheless, instead of sending reinforcements to the isolated portion of his army or drawing it out of reach of the attack, the Young Napoleon panicked and ordered a hasty attack on the Richmond defenses to gain a foothold and begin his artillery bombardment. The attack unfolded on the morning of June 25.[7]

Early that morning, Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps advanced down the Williamsburg Road within four miles of Richmond. Unfortunately for the Yankees, sufficient reinforcements failed to come up and aid the two brigades entering combat in the lead. Thus, the Federals withstood heavy combat with Ambrose Wright's Confederates until aid came up on both flanks. When this finally happened, the bluecoats moved within 100 yards of Wright's outer defense line. Despite considerable success in driving the enemy back to their trenches, Federal Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker ordered the attack broken off before noon. McClellan tardily arrived on the field at 1:00 p.m. and ordered a reengagement. However, it was too late to achieve any success. During the early afternoon lull, the Southerners had bolstered their defenses, and they fought hotly when the battle started again. Wright counterattacked, regaining almost all of the ground he had lost that morning. Darkness ended the fighting.[8]

The clash of June 25, the Battle of Oak Grove, gained nothing for the Federals. McClellan, having convinced himself that the Confederates had already assailed his right flank, ordered a hasty, ill-coordinated assault on Richmond's defenses and paid for it with several hundred losses. Some Federals contemptuously called it "The Battle of Casualties," seeing how little the offensive had done to tighten the noose on Richmond. Additionally, the stiff enemy resistance convinced McClellan that he faced 180,000 Southerners in his front; they actually numbered about 5 percent of that. Allan Pinkerton's faulty Federal intelligence service and McClellan's own wild imagination would dog the general for the rest of the campaign.[9]

At dawn on June 26, three Confederate divisions amassed on the southern bank of the Chickahominy River, waiting for the start of the attack on Porter's corps. Stonewall Jackson was set to open the assault by attacking V Corps' right flank from the north, but the Valley commander sent a message to Lee regretfully admitting his column was three hours behind schedule. Therefore Lee decided to wait, but Jackson still did not arrive. Frustrated and eager to see the assault open, A. P. Hill ordered his Light Division forward at 3:00 p.m. without Jackson's support. Porter fell back from the first assaults and reformed on the eastern edge of Beaver Dam Creek, just beyond the town of Mechanicsville. Hill's men came onward, suffering heavily from artillery fire. Lee, who heard firing and naturally assumed that Jackson had arrived, accompanied his

two remaining divisions across the Chickahominy and came to the realization that the assault was going in piecemeal—without Jackson. Even considering his disturbing aspect, Lee ordered the frontal assaults continued in hopes that the Valley commander would descend from the north. The Valley Army never made it to the field, and the sun set. In four hours of fighting, the Army of Northern Virginia had suffered almost 1,500 casualties, the Yankees one fifth of that. Lee found out shortly what had happened to Jackson. At 5:00 p.m., Stonewall had arrived at his designated stopping point, three miles from Beaver Dam Creek. Despite obvious signs that a major battle was raging in the distance, the general ordered his men to bivouac—with three hours of daylight left! Jackson's presence was sorely missed at the fight. McClellan could have assaulted the Confederates on either side of the river, furthering the June 26 victory by checking Lee's offensive on the north side or crashing through the thin defenses in front of Richmond. But he was scared to inaction by gross overestimates of Confederate strength and failed to take the initiative when victory was within grasp.[10]

Lee made plans for the next day's battle under the assumption that the Yankees would fall back to Powhite Creek and make their next stand there. However, Porter fell back farther than Lee had anticipated, fortifying Turkey Hill, on the eastern bank of Boatswain Creek during the night. After an early morning reconnaissance that failed to find the Yankees, Lee realized that his plan, identical to the one of June 26, would not be able to commence without a few changes. But faulty maps and poor staff work slowed the process of coordinating the battle to a crawl, and when the Confederates made contact, the battle unfolded much like the previous day. Confederate failure was largely the fault of Lee, who failed to send forward sufficient reconnaissance before beginning the June 27 assault. This mistake, paired with the fact that the general did not have in his possession a single map that showed the Yankees' primary natural defense, Boatswain Creek, resulted in the Confederates entering a battle they were not prepared to fight. For some unknown reason, the Southern commander let his units commit several frontal assaults, all the time waiting for Jackson to threaten Porter's northern flank. By the time dusk approached, some units had been in combat for four hours waiting for support. Thus, Lee's attempt to hold Porter in place while Jackson swooped down from the north fell to pieces. The Valley commander finally arrived in late afternoon, but in the Confederate center, not Porter's northern flank. Against indications that V Corps was shifting to protect bridges across the Chickahominy and therefore removing themselves from between the Confederates and White House, Lee ordered a massive general assault opened at 7:00 p.m. The only clear objective it could have achieved was that of pushing Porter off Turkey Hill, and the Federal general would gladly have obliged the Southerners without being pressed. The Rebel assault suffered heavily, but pushed Porter off Turkey Hill and compelled him to withdraw. The price Lee paid in casualties was not worth the small gains. Almost 9,000 Southerners had fallen during the afternoon's various clashes, and no clear objective had been reached. The final Confederate assault of the day had been anything but productive. Porter was already protecting bridges in his rear in preparation for a withdrawal. The Confederates' dusk attack was not necessary, and it brought them no closer to achieving a decisive campaign victory over the Army of the Potomac.[11]

Jackson's tardiness, Lee's failure to coordinate proper reconnaissance, and poor maps caused the Confederate effort at Gaines' Mill on June 27 to crumble. Jackson, who had ordered D. H. Hill to stray from attacking the exposed Federal right in lieu of his own (Jackson's) attack, failed to make the assault and arrived tardily on the wrong portion of the battlefield. By that time, the Confederate effort had bogged down. The costly dusk assault gained few favorable results for the Rebels, and the casualties were horrendous.[12]

June 28 was a quiet day near Richmond, aside from Confederate Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs' unauthorized and ill advised reconnaissance-in-force at Golding's Farm, east of the capital. Golding's Farm was Toombs' second black mark, his first having been a similar venture the day before a short distance away at Garnett's Farm. Both engagements combined cost the Rebels 438 of their numbers, the Federals only 189. Instead of complying with a directive instructing him to break off any engagement should he find no weaknesses in the Yankee line on June 27, Toombs threw more units into the fight when enemy resistance stiffened. The result was pointless bloodshed. When Toombs tried to renew the contest June 28, he met with a similar lack of success.[13]

Meanwhile, Fitz John Porter's corps moved to link up with the rest of the army, leaving behind tons of materials and thousands of wounded. McClellan finalized his decision to order V Corps to the south side of the Chickahominy after the minor action at Garnett's Farm. Little Mac thought he would be attacked on both flanks at once, and to avoid this danger he decided to move the Union supply base to Harrison's Landing, on the James River. This course of action was unnecessary, and it brought with it the complications of moving a supply base while engaged in a crucial string of engagements. With strong reinforcements, V Corps could have checked Lee. McClellan thought, however, that the abandonment of White House was necessary to save his army, which "might be defeated and slaughtered." Destruction of the Army of the Potomac was not a likely scenario, but the Federal general was fully convinced that he was outnumbered two to one, an estimate far from accurate. Despite a lack of substantiation to support the gross overestimates of Lee's strength, McClellan kept the telegraph operators busy sending desperate pleas for reinforcements to Washington. Meanwhile, the valuable supplies at White House were torched, and Porter began moving his troops south. Lee quickly resolved what movement Little Mac was coordinating, not just because of the smoke of the burning supplies, but because he was beginning to realize what was now painfully clear to Washington: McClellan was not a fighter.[14]

Once the Army of the Potomac was united, it moved across White Oak Swamp and toward Harrison's Landing. White Oak Swamp slowed the Union withdrawal to a crawl and gave Confederates an excellent opportunity to strike McClellan's stretched column. Unfortunately for hopeful Southerners, the man in whose hands the main Confederate attack rested, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, was not up to the task. Magruder was to coordinate his wing against the right flank of the enemy column, while Stonewall Jackson swung down from the north and smashed the Federal rear. Much like

the operations of the last few days' battles, the plan seemed simple on paper, but was not easy to coordinate on the battlefield, especially given Magruder's physical state. "Prince John" was using morphine heavily on June 29 for stomach pains. Its presence in his system tempered his normal daring attitude. Observers wrote that he seemed disoriented, unable to make decisions. Magruder was unquestionably out of character when he began expressing concerns that he was outnumbered, a fear that had not even fazed him when McClellan outnumbered him ten to one at Yorktown. Magruder should have turned his wing over to Lafayette McLaws, the senior division commander in the area, but he did not, and the Confederates went into that day's assault with an extreme disadvantage.[15]

The Federals had a major disadvantage going into the June 29 fight as well. McClellan, who had failed to stay with the rear guard at Savage's Station and assure its safety, headed south without appointing a commander in his place. The three corps commanders with the rear guard disagreed on how to coordinate the withdrawal and counter an enemy attack should one commence. One of those commanders was Samuel P. Heintzelman, who against all logic, decided the time had come for his corps to leave Savage's Station and exit White Oak Swamp. Heintzelman's movement exposed the Federal rear guard's right flank and left an excellent opportunity open for Stonewall Jackson. Federal II Corps commander Edwin Sumner did not know that the corps guarding his right flank was gone, and the Confederates had a clear road into his rear. Luckily for the Federals, Magruder was ill, and Jackson was too apathetic to take advantage of the Union disposition.[16]

A skirmish opened on the afternoon of June 29 at Savage's Station as Magruder cautiously moved his column against "Bull" Sumner's corps. However, neither side committed a large number of troops to the fight. Stonewall Jackson was lethargic and never came to the aid of his fellow commander, and Sumner seemed more concerned with escaping than countering the enemy movement. The day closed with indecisive results. "Prince John" had fought the entire battle outnumbered two to one, and Sumner, having committed under half his men to the engagement, could have used his numerical edge to gain a sweeping victory. Nevertheless, the day closed without critical action, and the Union withdrawal to Harrison's Landing continued.[17]

The Confederate plan for June 30 mirrored the strategy of the day before, only the intended striking point was now Glendale, and Benjamin Huger would take Magruder's place. Huger advanced cautiously that morning, and Jackson again failed to descend from White Oak Swamp to attack the Union rear, resulting in several hours of indecisive skirmishing and artillery dueling. When Thomas Munford informed Jackson of a route leading across the swamp to the vulnerable enemy rear guard, Stonewall seemed disinterested, and his apathy effectively removed his men from the main fight. Stonewall's indifference during the campaign reached an apogee when he was found sleeping behind a log—even as his artillery hurled shells blindly at Federal gunners in the woods across the remains of White Oak Bridge. The Valley Army never entered the battle at Glendale.[18]

At 4:00 p.m., a frustrated James Longstreet opened the assault by himself, sending his brigades in one at a time and entering a slugfest with George McCall. The fight was severe and continued after sundown. It cost the Confederates dearly, as they committed numerous frontal assaults and never exploited a gap on the Federal left, which, if augmented, would have cut off the Union rearguard. Thus, Lee suffered another tactical defeat because of his subordinates' failures to commit fully to the battle and Longstreet's costly piecemeal assaults, which resulted in 3,600 Confederate casualties. Gen. Lee was noticeably disappointed when he wrote his battle report eight months later, penning that had Huger and Jackson joined the fight, the results would have been "most disastrous to the enemy." D. H. Hill, whose troops were attached to Jackson's command and therefore remained inactive all day, later said of the battle, "It had been a gallant fight . . . but as an obstruction to the Federal retreat . . . amounted to nothing."[19]

By dawn on July 1, McClellan had drawn up his lines on Malvern Hill, a virtually impregnable plateau just north of the James River. His troops were frustrated that he had continued to retreat in the face of an inferior enemy, but continued to hope the Rebels would initiate a decisive battle and be shattered. Porter's corps and twelve batteries defended the open north face of Malvern Hill. This was the only direction from which the Confederates could effectively attack, and it would be no easy task. Lee issued confusing orders that morning, causing Magruder's column to get lost, but the Rebels finally reached Malvern Hill. Longstreet examined the plateau at 1:00 p.m. and received permission to rake the Federal lines with a 140-gun barrage. Lee informed his division commanders that upon inspecting the damage inflicted, Lewis Armistead's brigade on the right flank would move forward with a yell. That was the signal for the next unit in line to move out, and in echelon, the Confederate attack unfolded.[20]

Unfortunately for the Confederates, Longstreet's artillery attack never exceeded twenty-six guns, and the Union line held strong. Lee called off the infantry assault, but failed to properly inform his subordinates, and when Armistead, in trying to chase off enemy skirmishers, ordered his brigade forward, the Confederate division commanders thought that the attack was opening. Tragedy ensued as Confederate units dashed toward Malvern Hill, but were torn to pieces by canister and grapeshot. When dusk brought an end to the fighting, 5,500 Southerners littered the field along with 3,000 Yankees. Lee's failure to communicate with his subordinates had caused much needless bloodshed. The assault was over before many Southern generals knew they were not meant to move forward. D. H. Hill said of the Battle of Malvern Hill, "It was not war—it was murder." The Rebel defeat had been a heavy one. As pointed out by historian T. Harry Williams: "McClellan repulsed the Confederates so badly that had he counterattacked he probably would have defeated Lee and could have got Richmond. Instead he retired from the field. . . ." Little Mac planned to slink away from Lee's army, despite his men's ardor to fight. Even the usually cautious Fitz John Porter, whose corps was heavily damaged, encouraged McClellan to go on the offensive. Nevertheless, the Young Napoleon would not budge.[21]

The campaign was over. In eight days, McClellan's army had won six tactical victories, but the Union troops had little to show for their bloodshed. They had been steadily pushed back to Harrison's Landing, far from their goal at Richmond. One Yankee engineer bitterly remarked that the only thing Little Mac had accomplished was a "masterly retreat." This feeling was more prominent among general officers, men who saw that the Federals had a clear road to Richmond, but McClellan had been too timid to seize it. For the 15,849 casualties the Federals had sustained, they could say little about what they had accomplished, and it seemed to many that the losses would not have been suffered in vain under a more soldierly general. George B. McClellan was the engineer to plan the capture of Richmond, the quartermaster to supply the army as it advanced, and the commissary to make sure its soldiers were well fed. He was anything but the field general to execute it.[22]

Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had come out the strategic victor. It had eliminated the immediate threat to Richmond, but at a heavy cost: 20,164 killed, wounded, or captured. Poor staff work, faulty maps, lack of communication between generals, and tactical incompetence had placed a heavy burden on Confederate soldiers, who paid the price for their commanders' mistakes. Stonewall Jackson's apathetic generalship was consistent throughout the week. Additionally, when Lee was forced to consider changing his plans in the face of battlefield delays, unanticipated terrain features, and changes in enemy positioning, the Virginia aristocrat failed to formulate alternate courses of action. Rather, Lee went ahead with his original plans, plans that did not fit the altered state of affairs. The result was tactical failure.[23]

In the summer of 1862, generals North and South were unprepared to fight a campaign the magnitude of the Seven Days. Principal commanders in the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac displayed a variety of shortcomings. Looking back on the fateful week that he confronted Robert E. Lee's army, George B. McClellan wrote, on the day of his death, "It was one of those magnificent episodes which dignify a nation's history and are fit subjects for the grandest efforts of the poet and the painter." Despite the former general's turgid reminiscence of the operations around Richmond, the Seven Days was not a splendid affair, but an unfortunate reflection of how severe the consequences of military blunders could be.[24]

NOTES

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[3] Williams, T. Harry. *Lincoln and His Generals.* New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952, p. 126.

[4] Carmichael, Peter S., "Stuart's Ride Around McClellan," *Civil War*, Issue 51 (June 1995), pp. 50-53; Krick, Robert E.L., "The Dabbs House Meeting," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp.53-55.

[5] Newton, Stephen. *Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond.* Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998, pp.167-68; Carmichael, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

[6] Shelby Foote. *The Civil War: Fort Sumter to Perryville.* New York, NY: Random House, 1958, p. 475; Krick, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54; Martin, *op. cit.,* p. 138; Stephen W. Sears. *To the Gates of Richmond.* New York, NY: Ticknor & Fields, 1992, pp. 66-67.

[7] Foote, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-77.

[8] Miller, William J. "The Battle of Oak Grove," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp. 55-57; Kennedy, Frances H. "Oak Grove," *The Civil War Battlefield Guide*, Kennedy, F.H. (ed.), Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998, p. 93.

[9] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

[10] Alexander, Edward Porter. *Military Memoirs of a Confederate.* New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910, p. 117; Andrus, Michael J. "The Battle of Beaver Dam Creek," *Civil War* Issue 57, pp. 59-60; Kennedy, F.H. "Beaver Dam Creek," *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94; Martin, *op. cit.* p.148; Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-74; Sears, *op. cit.* pp.69,76.

[11] Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp.124-25, 128-29; Bridges, Hal. *Lee's Maverick General: Daniel Harvey Hill.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1961, pp.69,71; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp.163, 173, 175, 179; Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp.80-86; Sears, *op. cit.* p.248.

[12] Krick, Robert E.L. "The Battle of Gaines' Mill," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp. 61-63; Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp.85-86.

[13] Patchan, Scott C. "The Battle of Garnett's Farm," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp.63-65; Kennedy, F.H. "Garnett's and Golding's Farms," *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[14] Foote, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-93; Williams, *op. cit.*, p.119.

[15] Carmichael, Peter S. "The Battle of Savage's Station," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), p.66; Martin, *op. cit.*, p.184; McClellan, George B. *McClellan's Own Story.* New York, NY: Charles Webster & Company, 1887, pp.345,422-23; Sears, *op. cit.*, pp.251-53.

[16] Carmichael, "Savage's Station," *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

[17] Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp.149-51; Carmichael, "Savage's Station," *op. cit.* pp.65-69; Martin, *op. cit.*, 192; Kennedy, F.H. "Savage's Station," *op. cit.*, p.98.

[18] Miller, William J. "The Battle of Glendale," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp. 69-71; Hattaway, Herman and Ethan S. Rafuse, "Glendale," *Battlefield Guide*, p. 98.

[19] Miller, *op. cit.*, pp.71-73; Hattaway and Rafuse, *op. cit.*, p.100; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp.209-12; Sears, *op. cit.*, p.307; Wheeler, Richard. *Sword Over Richmond.* New York,NY: Harper & Row, 1986, p.335.

[20] Bridges, *op. cit.*, pp.81-83; Carmichael, Peter S. "The Battle of Malvern Hill," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp.73, 75; Litterst, Michael D. "Malvern Hill," *Battlefield Guide,* pp.101, 103; Martin, *op. cit.*, pp.222-27; Sears, *op. cit.*, p.317.

[21] Catton, *op. cit.*, p. 165; Carmichael, "Malvern Hill," *op. cit.,* pp. 75-76; Litterst, "Malvern Hill," *op. cit.*, pp.103-104; Sears, *op. cit.*, pp.319,335-36.

[22] Coski, John. "Denouement at Harrison's Landing," *Civil War* Issue 51 (June 1995), pp.76-78; Foote, *op. cit.*, pp.514-16; McClellan, *op. cit.*, pp.439-40; Sears, *op. cit.*, p.347.

[23] Foote, *op. cit.,* p. 516.

[24] McClellan, *op. cit.,* p. 440; Williams, *op. cit.,* pp. 126-27.